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Results from the survey EU-25 Watch No. 2 
Barbara Lippert/Timo Goosmann* 
 
For the European Union, the troublesome year 
2005 ended on an upbeat tone. The somewhat 
unexpected compromise on the financial per-
spective 2007-2013 that was reached at the 
meeting of the European Council in December 
2005 will encourage the Union and its 25 
members to address the challenges of Euro-
pean integration and its immediate tasks with 
more confidence.  
 
The future of Europe 
 
The Union’s agenda is shaped by demands of 
deepening and widening on the background of 
economic globalisation and transnational 
threats to security and welfare. After the big 
bang enlargement of 2004 and the setback in 
the process of ratifying the Constitutional 
treaty (TCE) that occurred in spring 2005 the 
European Union is in a puzzling state of mind. 
The December 2005 European Council with- 
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The article is a slightly adapted version of Barbara Lip-
pert/Timo Goosmann: Introduction. A portrait of the 
Union in a puzzling state of mind, in: IEP (ed.): EU-25 
Watch, No. 2, Berlin 2006, pp. 8-17, http://www.iep-
berlin.de/publik/EU25-Watch/EU-25_ 
Watch-No2.pdf.  
drew its original neutral term “period of reflec-
tion”1 for dealing with the constitutional crisis 
and re-instated the positive formula “future of 
Europe”2 that had been declared at the Laeken 
summit in 2001. This shall signal that big is-
sues (Why EU? What kind of EU and Europe 
do we want?) beyond the usual EU-business 
are at stake. The 25 heads of state and govern-
ment also acknowledged the importance to 
follow closely the “national debates on the 
future of Europe underway in all Member 
States”3. This exactly is the underlying idea 
and purpose of “EU-25 Watch”: to learn more 
about preferences, mind sets and other domes-
tic conditions which shape positions of gov-
ernments and other actors in the EU arena and 
which drive European integration.  
 
The recent issue of “EU-25 Watch”4 sheds 
light on how key issues like the “Lisbon proc-
ess” or the “role of the EU in the world” are 
                                                 
1 Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States of the European Union on the Ratification 
of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
European Council, 18 June 2005. 
2 Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 December 2005, para-
graph I. 
3 Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 December 2005, point 
I.5.  
4 IEP (ed.): EU-25 Watch, No. 2, Berlin, http://www.iep-
berlin.de/publik/EU25-Watch/EU-25_Watch-No2.pdf. 
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framed, debated and addressed in the 25 mem-
ber states and in four acceding/candidate coun-
tries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey). 
Regularly, authors not only refer to policy ma-
kers but also to pressure groups and the media, 
thus giving a comprehensive insight into natio- 
nal discourses and current as well as upcoming 
issues. Out of the richness of information and 
interpretations and the many details that are 
given from the perspectives of 29 countries 
four general observations shall be put forward 
for further discussion: 
 
• Heterogeneity and diversity of preferences, conditions and capacities is a dominant feature 
of the EU-25. Member states are currently going through different cycles of modernisation 
and adaptation. The diverse and uneven implementation of the Lisbon strategy is a case in 
point.  While old member states like France, Germany and Italy are particularly slow, coun-
tries like the Nordics and other newcomers with a recent history of Europeanisation via mem-
bership are on path of reform and still have an impetus for change that others lack. 
Expectations are high that the EU should combine competitiveness with social security and 
solidarity. 
• Across the EU a gap between the citizens and the political class is widening. Considering 
the lack of trust it is not enough for European leaders to go on with business as usual, espe-
cially since the political crisis is widely interpreted as a crisis of leadership at both national 
and EU level. The future of the TCE is open, a wait and see attitude is prevalent in most 
member states. 
• Consolidation and limits of the EU in political, functional and also geographic terms is be-
coming a major concern in member states. Enlargement fatigue sweeps through old member 
states. 
• European integration is currently largely driven by external factors that set priorities of ac-
tion for the EU. However, an attractive integration project à la single market or EMU is 
missing that would strengthen internal political cohesion of the EU. 
 
To draw a picture that captures the whole of 
the EU-25 and come to overall conclusions 
from this analysis is difficult. We have to sim-
plify and generalise from country specifics in 
order to crystallise trends and patterns in the 
EU-25. Readers are invited to follow their own 
guiding questions and make comparisons be-
tween the member states. In the future we will 
surely need to devote more time to understand 
what is going on in the member states and how 
Europeanisation works both ways, down from 
and up to the EU-level, thus making sense of 
the puzzling state of the Union. 
 
Heterogeneity and diversity 
 
After the accession of ten more member states 
the EU became bigger and more diverse. 
While a trivial fact in itself, the implications of 
this growth in membership are manifold and 
deserve further empirical investigation and 
academic explanations.5 One example for het-
                                                 
5 This is a core question for EU-CONSENT, especially 
regarding the mutually reinforcing effects of deepening 
and widening of the EU. For the development of sets of 
expectations concerning past and future integration of 
Europe cf. http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?Cat 
Id=259&ContentType=Projects, latest access 9 January 
2006. 
erogeneity inside the enlarged EU are different 
levels of prosperity, varying preferences with 
regard to policy choices and basic orientations 
towards European integration.6 The size of 
population and economy as well as geographic 
location and political/cultural identities play an 
important role in determining positions of EU 
governments.   
 
Heterogeneity and diversity are to some ex-
tent an issue of old/new member states, but not 
simply an East/West issue if one also takes into 
account previous rounds of enlargement. New 
member states enter the EU on a path of re-
form and adaptation. Given the broadness of 
the Union’s acquis the scope and depth of this 
specific form of “Europeanisation” (adapting 
to EU demands in individual ways) impacts on 
the whole of the politico-administrative and 
economic order and has some serious social 
consequences too.7 Successful membership 
                                                 
6 Compare for example the Italian and Estonian contribu-
tion to EU-25 Watch. The survey contains 29 country 
reports (308 pages). The pdf document is navigable so 
that respective countries or questions can easily be found. 
7 Cf. Lippert, Barbara / Umbach, Gaby: The Pressure of 
Europeanisation. From post-communist state administra-
tions to normal players in the EU system, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005.  
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mostly depends on continuing the adaptation 
and reform process after accession, even if the 
pace slows down and priority measures are 
reconsidered, as it seems to be the case in 
Hungary for example.8 
 
Challenges of globalisation – country constel-
lations 
Considering how the 25 member states respond 
to the challenges of globalisation, the comple-
tion of the internal market with its increased 
competition also among member states and to 
the functioning of the Monetary Union we can 
currently observe the following constellations:  
 
Interestingly, among the most successful9 EU 
members are the EFTA countries (Finland, 
Sweden and Austria) that joined the EU in 
1995 – the enlargement previous to the 2004 
round. Their reform tracks date back to the 
nineties when they introduced public sector 
reforms, focusing in fields such as social secu-
rity, the labour market and research and devel-
opment, both prior to and after their member-
ship. However, the example of the likewise 
successful Denmark proves that it is not simply 
an issue of old/new members. It appears that 
the Nordic countries – with their typical, how-
ever not uniform, social model that is based on 
high levels of taxation as well as social secu-
rity payments – are perceived as positive ex-
amples of coping with change throughout the 
EU. The so called “flexicurity”10 is often re-
ferred to by authors as a point of orientation 
for their countries’ strategies.11 There are some 
important conditions for the success: The Nor-
dic countries have comparatively small and 
very open economies with a distinct mix of 
high educational standards, a high labour pro-
ductivity, a good ability to adapt in interna-
tional competition, an efficient administration 
and an appropriate resource management that 
combines with high levels of social cohesion 
                                                 
8 Cf. the Hungarian chapter on the Lisbon Agenda (ques-
tion 4). 
9 In terms of the Lisbon ranking (general economic back-
ground, employment, innovation and research, economic 
reform, social cohesion and environment). Cf. European 
Commission: Structural indicators. Update of the Statisti-
cal Annex (annex 1) to the 2005 Report from the Com-
mission to the Spring European Council, Brussels, 11 
March 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/pdf/statistical_annex_
2005_en.pdf, latest access 9 January 2006. 
10 Cf. the Danish chapter on the Lisbon Agenda (question 
4). 
11 Cf. for example the Turkish and Estonian chapters on 
the Lisbon Agenda (question 4). 
and a (still relatively) high share of govern-
ment expenditure in GDP.  
 
Among the better performing countries of the 
EU are also the UK, Ireland and Spain. The 
UK thinks of itself as the “master pupil” that 
has no basic problems in implementing the 
Lisbon agenda,12 given its track record from 
Thatcher to Blair in deregulation, the approach 
“from welfare to work” and other reforms de-
scribed as the “Third Way”. 
 
Ireland, and to some extent also Spain, are two 
countries that benefited (and particularly Ire-
land still does) from a probably overly gener-
ous structural/agricultural policy and that com-
bined these EU transfers with a course of mod-
ernisation that is viable and constantly pro-
duces growth.13 Interestingly, as far as the 
mental shape and economic conditions are 
concerned, these countries – government and 
population alike – seem less frightened to cope 
with an environment of global and European 
competitors.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum we meet 
stagnant economies and slow reforms of the 
welfare systems (pension, health, social secu-
rity system reforms) in the founding countries, 
notably in France, Germany14 and Italy. 
Given the economic weight of the three as the 
economic “powerhouse” in the West of the EU 
(combined with the South of the UK) their 
performance is crucial for the entire EU. While 
there is a general awareness of the economic 
obstacles among policy makers within the 
three countries, the scope of the reforms differs 
significantly, as well as the level of support for 
the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda. For ex-
ample, the French report states that “in France, 
the Lisbon Agenda is not very well known and 
not very well considered. It is mainly an inter-
governmental process, and, as such, is often 
regarded as a sign of the loss of influence of 
                                                 
12 Cf. the United Kingdom’s chapter on the Lisbon 
Agenda (question 4). 
13 While Spain’s growth rate (3,1% in 2004) is high, also 
the unemployment rate settled on high levels of 11% 
(2004), cf. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_ 
pageid=1133,47800773,1133_47803568&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL, latest access 9 January 2006. 
14 In some respect, Germany probably has to be consid-
ered as a special case. The heritage of unification burdens 
German economy and the tax payers. Annually still about 
4 per cent of its GDP is transferred to the new Länder. 
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traditional French views on Europe. It is 
widely regarded as a British invention.”15  
  
In the spectrum marked on one side by dy-
namic and on the other by rather stagnant 
countries, the new member states are located 
in between. They do not follow one and the 
same approach16, but they share basic orienta-
tions and conditions of countries that have 
undergone a comprehensive pre-accession and 
modernisation course and are still on a path of 
reform and catching up.17 Like many Western 
European and Mediterranean countries they 
lean towards corporatist and/or clientelist so-
cial models that look for a balance between 
efficiency and solidarity. Thus they demand 
high transfers from the EU budget for the agri-
cultural sector, for reducing regional and social 
disparities and for investment in infrastructure. 
However, for catching up with the compara-
tively wealthy and robust economies of the old 
EU-15 they try to make use of their compara-
tive advantages to the full. That is why – for 
the time being – they are also in favour of a 
liberal agenda, why they support the freedom 
of services based on the country of origin prin-
ciple, why many are reluctant to get chained by 
a working time directive,18 and why they try to 
attract FDI through low taxes and simple tax 
systems etc.  
 
On this background we conclude that the 
member states are currently going through 
different cycles of modernisation and adapta-
tion so that there is a lack of simultaneity. This 
hampers any substantial agreement on concrete 
measures and effective programmes at EU-
level. A good example to illustrate this point is 
the Lisbon process.  
 
Lisbon – shared goals but no drive 
The goals of the Lisbon process are widely 
shared among the members of the EU. Given 
the diverse contexts, traditions and models of 
social systems, labour market policy etc. the 
EU preferred coordination (by means of the 
rather loose method of open coordination) over 
legal harmonisation or other legally binding 
impositions and sanctions. The results so far 
                                                 
15 Cf. the French, German and Italian chapters on the 
Lisbon Agenda (question 4). 
16 Compare for example Slovakia with Hungary. 
17 See for example Estonia and Latvia that are inspired by 
Anglo-Saxon models, which others, like Hungary are not.  
18 Cf. the Estonian, Slovak and Slovenian chapters on the 
Lisbon Agenda (question 4). 
are meagre, and where there is improvement it 
is not linked to incentives from the Lisbon 
process or perceived in this context. Every-
where in the EU member states are making 
additional efforts to increase growth and im-
prove employment strategies.19 They are aware 
of the fact that the national, not the EU level is 
key so that they refrain from claiming a more 
pro-active approach of the EU, notwithstand-
ing some support for spending more money 
from the EU budget on “Lisbon activities”. 
There is also a common understanding with 
regard to the priorities and key sectors like 
education, knowledge-based industries etc. 
However, there are very different experiences 
and preferences with regard to the ways to 
achieve these goals and at which social costs.20 
This is also reflected in many authors’ analyses 
of the negative outcome of the referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Nether-
lands.21  
 
The attitudes towards two directives which are 
currently debated in the EU – the services 
directive and the working time directive – 
show the differing cost/benefit analyses and 
diverse effects that are expected from the im-
plementation. It also shows that the level of 
commitment and participation of non-
governmental actors (social partners) and na-
tional parliaments in the formation of a politi-
cal position of the governments varies consid-
erably among member states: The contribu-
tions within “EU-25 Watch” suggest that it is 
generally more significant among the “old” 
members while especially in many of the ten 
member states that acceded the EU in 2004 
official government positions seem to domi-
nate.22 For the EU, it will become crucial to 
assess and explain the likely social fallout and 
the overall impact of any piece of legislation as 
far as member states, economic sectors, social 
and professional groups and others are con-
cerned. This information, provided for namely 
                                                 
19 Take the Slovak Minerva project as an example, cf. the 
Slovak chapter on the Lisbon Agenda (question 4). 
20 Some authors refer to this debate in the context of 
„social dumping“, cf. the Austrian, Belgian, German, 
Luxembourgian and Portuguese chapters on the Lisbon 
Agenda (question 4). 
21 Cf. for example the Croatian, Finnish, French, Irish and 
Slovenian chapters on the Constitutional crisis (question 
1). 
22 This becomes apparent comparing e.g. the Danish, 
Finnish, German and Italian chapters on the Lisbon 
Agenda (question 4) with the respective answers from 
e.g. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland. 
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by the Commission, will certainly influence 
the formation of national positions and also of 
transnational actors.   
 
Financial framework – little innovation 
From the country reports, written before the 
European Council reached an agreement on the 
financial framework 2007-2013, one could 
already conclude that the vast majority of 
member states was prepared to accept the Lux-
embourg proposal of 15 June 2005 as the basis 
for further negotiations. This implied a far 
lower budgetary ceiling (1,06% of GNP) than 
originally proposed by the Commission (1,21% 
of GNP), a preservation of the 2002 agreement 
on the ceiling for CAP expenditure and – on 
the income side – a reduction of the British 
rebate. On the expenditure side room of ma-
noeuvre existed more or less under the appro-
priations “Competitiveness for growth and 
employment”, “The EU as a global partner” 
and, because of its sheer volume, under the 
appropriation “Cohesion for growth and em-
ployment”. Notwithstanding the general sym-
pathy to direct EU resources towards the Lis-
bon goals (create new and better jobs, improve 
competitiveness on a global scale) and concede 
priority to fund R&D projects, the proposal 
backed by France and the UK to establish a 
globalisation fund was greeted with little en-
thusiasm.23    
 
The new member states in particular were 
interested in a timely compromise within the 
British presidency (2005), fearing that other-
wise payments would be postponed considera-
bly and probably millions of Euro could be 
lost. Their interest in a quick deal was stronger 
than considering at this point the arguments for 
a fundamental restructuring of the budget on 
the expenditure side and a consistent own re-
sources mechanism. The Maltese answer to 
question 3 on the financial framework reflects 
this attitude: “The government and opposition 
[…] have argued that a compromise agreement 
is better than no agreement at all.” Moreover, 
there was little innovative thinking and new 
proposals around. Many perceived these nego-
tiations as a déjà vu of the Agenda 2000, how-
ever with a different constellation of member 
states. Any agreement had to bridge the notori-
ous cleavages between the net recipients and 
                                                 
23 Cf. the Danish and Slovak chapters on the financial 
framework (question 3) and the Belgian and Latvian 
chapters on priorities and perspectives of the EU (ques-
tion 7). 
the net contributors. As political and media 
reactions across Europe have shown the 
agreement reached at the European Council in 
December 2005 is largely appreciated and met 
with relief, but it does not show real innova-
tions. 
 
The bargaining over the financial framework 
proved that for the EU (level) it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to produce a coherent and 
convincing output. Considering the constella-
tion of member states described above coali-
tion-building is volatile and will certainly 
remain a big issue for all governments. In a 
bigger and more diverse EU the com- and per-
plexities of problems and solutions increase. 
Thus diversity and heterogeneity aggravate the 
legitimacy/efficiency dilemma of the EU. The 
upgrading of the common interest - which 
should be more than the agglomeration of the 
interests of the 25 - is highly demanded yet it is 
hard to achieve.  
 
When asked about upcoming issues on the 
national agenda that might over time also be 
uploaded to the EU level or influence decisions 
taken there often issues linked to the Lisbon 
agenda are identified by the authors like em-
ployment24, competitiveness25, decentralisa-
tion26 and the preparation for the Euro-zone27 
in the case of the new members. 
 
The capacity to act also influences the EU’s 
acceptance among the citizens of its member 
states.  
 
Citizens and political elite – the gap is 
growing 
 
The fact that some governments are particu-
larly open minded towards globalisation, op-
posed to define stricter rules to govern global-
isation and also to regulate the internal market 
does not mean that this approach is shared by 
the majority of the citizens nor that the socio-
economic situation of that particular country is 
                                                 
24 Cf. for example the Austrian, French, Hungarian, 
Italian, Luxembourgian, Portuguese, Slovenian and Turk-
ish chapters on Upcoming Issues and Events (question 6). 
25 Cf. for example the Croatian, Estonian, Finnish, Ger-
man and Irish chapters on Upcoming Issues and Events 
(question 6). 
26 Cf. for example the Slovenian chapter on Upcoming 
Issues and Events (question 6). 
27 Cf. for example the Cypriot, Czech, Latvian, Lithua-
nian, Maltese, Polish and Slovak chapters on Upcoming 
Issues and Events (question 6). 
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at ease. Take the case of Estonia: The govern-
ment and political class reassure EU-partners – 
“We like globalisation”28 – while income dis-
parities are high, the GDP per capita is still 
among the lowest among the EU-2529 and un-
employment was above 9% in 2004.30 Another 
example is Slovakia: While the government 
receives a remarkable degree of acclaim con-
sidering its reform strategy31 social exclusion 
still constitutes a major obstacle and unem-
ployment even remained above 18% in 2004.32   
 
Expectations-capabilities gap 
This might indicate a growing divide between 
the political classes in the new member 
states and the citizens and indicate an upcom-
ing problem also for the EU as a whole. The 
centrist programme of the party Law and Jus-
tice (PiS) in Poland (winner of parliamentary 
and presidential elections) signals the return of 
a more state interventionist, etatistic govern-
ance approach, focusing on an active role of 
the state in social and employment policy. This 
goes together with concerns over good 
governance, a challenge also for some old EU 
member states. In the chapter on upcoming 
issues and events in each member state (ques-
tion 6) the contributors describe a number of 
critical issues of governance in the respective 
countries. On one hand, many issues are 
framed by domestic agendas, but a number of 
core topics such as competitiveness, the fight 
against unemployment, health care and retire-
ment/pensions can be observed in many coun-
tries as all European concerns 
Overall, public opinion in the EU-member 
states is more sceptical and status quo ori-
ented than the political class. This may be one 
reason why better leadership is demanded by 
so many commentators and policy makers,33 
among them Tony Blair as can be found in the 
                                                 
28 Prime Minister Andrus Ansip at Hampton Court, cf. 
the Estonian chapter on the priorities and perspectives of 
the EU (question 7), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 291. 
29 Even though the GDP per capita in Purchasing Power 
Standards in percent of the EU-25 average has risen from 
41,2% (2000) to 51,5% (2004). 
30 Cf. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid= 
1133,47800773, 1133_47803568&_dad=portal&_schema 
=PORTAL, latest access 9 January 2006. 
31 Cf. the Slovak chapter on the Lisbon Agenda (question 
4). 
32 Cf. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid= 
1133,47800773, 1133_47803568&_dad=portal&_schema 
=PORTAL, latest access 9 January 2006. 
33 Cf. e.g. the Belgian, Croatian, Finnish, Greek, Hungar-
ian, Slovak and the UK chapters on the Constitutional 
Crisis (question 1). 
United Kingdom’s contribution: “The crisis 
should be seen as one of political leadership in 
general: neither at the national nor the Euro-
pean level have politicians been providing the 
answers that the people are demanding as a 
response to economic and social change.”34 In 
the Finnish chapter on the constitutional crisis 
the authors characterise the crisis “as a failure 
of the European leadership in listening and 
relating to the wider public.”35 The Hungarian 
report goes even further, stating that “Euro-
pean integration is desperately missing politi-
cal leadership and visions of the future. One 
can say that the highest ranking politicians of 
the member states ‘betrayed’ Europe, since 
they do not perceive the EU any more as an 
excellent historical opportunity to solve prob-
lems and face challenges in common, but 
rather as a battlefield of clashing national in-
terests.”36 
 
However, if there is a consensus, it is that “the 
EU” should find the ideal way to combine 
competitiveness with social security. In this 
sense and despite the many types of social 
models and their variations that exist in the 
EU, the authors point out a marked difference 
to the USA. It has often been concluded that 
citizens (and increasingly politicians as well) 
are ambivalent whether the EU is part of the 
problem or part of the solution of challenges 
like globalisation. This seems to be more than 
a question of better communication, it is also a 
question of clear cut analysis. Political actors 
(also EU institutions) have to know and ex-
plain to what extent there is an added value of 
involving the EU or transferring competencies 
to the EU in a given policy field. This is even 
more difficult in times when citizens lack trust 
in the institutions of the EU.  
 
At the same time the EU is also confronted 
with high expectations about what it should37 
do so that the EU risks a growing expecta-
tions/capability gap. The debate about the 
constitution and the demand for a “social 
Europe” illustrates these contradictory expecta-
tions and the gap between competencies of the 
                                                 
34 Cf. the UK chapter on the Constitutional Crisis (ques-
tion 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 103. 
35 Cf. the Finnish chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 48. 
36 Cf. the Hungarian chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 62. 
37 See contributions to question 7 (reinventing the Euro-
pean social model/cope with globalisation), e.g. from 
Hungary. 
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EU and public expectations. This is reflected in 
statements like the one from the Belgian State 
Secretary for European Affairs, Didier Donfut, 
who according to the Belgian contribution 
believes “that Europe’s citizens do not see the 
Union bringing any solution that is decisive for 
guaranteeing their existence. They have in-
creasing expectations with regard to Europe, 
but many have the impression that Europe is 
becoming a problem rather than a solution for 
their interests in unemployment, social vulner-
ability, environmental deterioration, climate 
change, de-industrialisation and increased en-
ergy costs.”38 
 
Constitutional and political crisis of the EU 
While the notion “crisis” is widely accepted to 
describe the EU after the negative referenda 
and the failed summit of June 2005, the gov-
ernments of the 25 responded calmly and were 
eager to de-dramatise the situation. They 
interpreted the “non” and “nee” as being more 
than an accident but less than a catastrophe, 
they called it a “setback”39, a “warning”40 or a 
“wake-up call”41 rather than a “turning point” 
in European integration. However, in media 
and academic commentary and probably also 
behind closed doors cabinets and party circles 
discuss the extent of this crisis with more in-
tensity and critical objectivity. To some the EU 
is at a critical juncture of the European integra-
tion process while others feel reminded of the 
traditional ups and downs in the process of 
integration.42 
 
Most actors (probably including the citizens) 
are at a loss about how to make sense of the 
crisis and how to overcome it, i.e. how to ex-
ploit the chances offered by the wake up call. 
Those who voted negatively or did not vote at 
all did not send an unambiguous message: 
Their reasons rooted in the domestic economic 
and political situation – aspects that are inten-
sively analysed in the chapter on the constitu-
tional crisis (question 1) – and echoed a grow-
ing estrangement vis-à-vis the EU. The image 
                                                 
38 Cf. the Belgian chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 24. 
39 Cf. e.g. the Finnish, Lithuanian, Slovak and the Slove-
nian chapters on the Constitutional Crisis (question 1). 
40 Cf. e.g. the Bulgarian and Croatian chapters on the 
Constitutional Crisis (question 1). 
41 Cf. e.g. the Austrian, Cypriot, Irish and Latvian chap-
ters on the Constitutional Crisis (question 1). 
42 Cf. e.g. the Croatian, Danish, Greek, Hungarian and 
Lithuanian chapters on the Constitutional Crisis (question 
1). 
of the EU as a stronghold to cope with the 
challenges of the future is diminishing. 
 
As already pointed out above, many contribu-
tors to “EU-25 Watch” No. 2 interpret the con-
stitutional crisis as a crisis of leadership. Ap-
parently, governments are hesitant how to re-
spond to the significant degree of discontent. 
To go on as if nothing had changed – an option 
provided for by the bureaucratic machinery (on 
all levels of the EU) that continues to work as a 
matter of routine – is perceived as a disregard 
of those who said “no”. A minority of the au-
thors argues that the TCE is dead and cannot 
be saved. The Polish report contains a state-
ment of the leader of the ruling Law and Jus-
tice party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who claims 
that the whole idea of the reflection period 
unnecessarily prolongs the crisis: “We should 
accept that the constitutional treaty was re-
jected, the Nice Treaty is in force and if we 
were to discuss a long term solution of the 
institutional problems we should start from the 
scratch”.43 Similar points of view can be drawn 
from the UK chapter on the constitutional cri-
sis (question 1). 
 
More frequent is a “wait and see attitude”44 
and the impulse rather than the strategy to 
shelve the TCE or, as formulated in the Hun-
garian report, a “hibernation”45 of the docu-
ment. This is not only an expression of the 
need for reflection and orientation. It also re-
veals that a consistent idea or programme for 
an alternative and different EU is missing. That 
is also the reason why many shy away from 
obvious alternatives, be it cherry picking, re-
writing and /or re-organising parts of the TCE 
or starting it all over again from the Nice 
treaty.46 Also the core-Europe and other flexi-
ble arrangements of “25 minus x” that shall 
help govern an ever larger EU gain little sup-
port from governments and citizens alike.  
 
The slow start of the period of reflection in the 
member states underlines that a glue is missing 
but also that the shock is not as productive in 
terms of original thinking as hoped for. Some 
                                                 
43 Cf. the Polish chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 84. 
44 Cf. the Finnish and Swedish chapters on the Constitu-
tional Crisis (question 1). 
45 Cf. the Hungarian chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 63. 
46 Cf. e.g. the Belgian, Danish, Dutch, German, Hungar-
ian, Irish, Portuguese and Romanian chapters on the 
Constitutional Crisis (question 1). 
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experiences are disastrous, like the one in the 
Netherlands where after the rejection of the 
TCE a broad public debate was supposed to be 
launched, but eventually had to be stopped 
even before the start due to disagreement be-
tween political parties, the government and the 
parliament regarding the question who would 
chair the debate.47 Also in other member states 
it has proven to be very difficult to engage 
citizens in a public debate on TCE contents.48 
  
Bearing in mind all these aspects one could 
ask: Is the so called constitutional crisis an 
episode rather than a critical juncture? Proba-
bly only historians will tell us, but there is a 
danger in just going on with business as 
usual. One of the reasons why the EU ran into 
the ‘referenda trap’ is that it underestimated 
latent medium term developments and ignored 
processes of declining legitimacy and dimin-
ishing levels of mutual trust among the mem-
ber states.49 So far the reflection period has 
shown that taking into consideration the wid-
ening gap between citizens and the political 
elite an intense public debate cannot simply be 
launched by decree and that trust in the EU 
cannot be restored by PR means. 
 
Consolidation and limits of the Union 
 
Recently in many member states and also the 
European Parliament, a debate on the limits of 
the EU has started and gained momentum after 
the negative referenda in France and the Neth-
erlands. Limits refer to the EU’s scope of ac-
tivities, competences and geographic bounda-
ries internally50 and externally. It is again a 
subject of diversity and heterogeneity in the 
EU. The official term in Eurospeak is “con-
solidation”.51  
                                                 
47 Cf. the Dutch chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1). 
48 Cf. e.g. the Bulgarian, Cypriot, Czech, Maltese, Roma-
nian, Slovak and Turkish chapters on the Constitutional 
Crisis (question 1). 
49 Moreover, public opinion is not without contradictions. 
Subsequent to the referenda in France and the Nether-
lands or other countries like Luxembourg no social or 
other popular movement against the EU or for a different 
EU appeared. 
50 This aspect was not directly addressed in the questions. 
However, there is some reference made in the answers to 
question 1, e.g. concerning ways out of the crisis or TCE 
innovations that should be implemented based on the 
Nice Treaty. 
51 Regarding the use of the term “consolidation” cf. e.g. 
the following press release: European Commission: 
Consolidation, Conditionality, Communication – the 
Apparently the EU that now encompasses the 
largest part of the continent needs to reflect 
upon its limits also in geographic terms. 
There is not one government that straightfor-
wardly argues that the EU should definitely 
answer where it should end. However, for-
mally the EU has not entered into any further 
commitments that go beyond the four countries 
that are also covered by the “EU-25 Watch” 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia) and 
the rest of the Western Balkans that have a 
“European perspective” as well as the leftover 
EFTA countries. This would add up to a Union 
of around 35 member states, depending on the 
future splits in post-Yugoslavia. Notwithstand-
ing the affirmation of consolidation (and of the 
criteria as far as the qualification for member-
ship is concerned), as in the past, proximity 
and ties with non-EU neighbours determine 
preferences of members to pave the way for 
their neighbours to join the EU in the future. 
Ukraine52 and Moldova53 are obvious candi-
dates for this line of thinking.  
 
There is however no movement inside the EU 
for shutting the door to others forever. More-
over, the reports show a strong sense to keep 
the promise and stick to the signed treaty on 
accession with Bulgaria and Romania,54 de-
spite concerns as to the fitness of these coun-
tries in political and economic terms. That is 
one reason why many reports now refer to a 
strict observance of the Copenhagen criteria 
and also refer to the capacity of the Union to 
absorb new members without loosing its dy-
namic. A change is underway that acknowl-
edges the need of consolidation and function-
ing of the already big EU rather than promot-
ing expansion further and further to the East. 
Enlargement fatigue sweeps through the EU. 
For the time being this assessment is more 
frequent in the old EU55, among the six origi-
nal members in particular, than in the new 
                                                                       
strategy of the enlargement policy, IP/05/1392, 
09.11.2005.  
52 Cf. the Polish chapter on the Future of EU Enlargement 
(question 2). 
53 Cf. the Romanian chapter on the Future of EU Enlarge-
ment (question 2). 
54 The two countries fear a negative spill over by connect-
ing the ratification of the TCE with their accession. Cf. 
the Bulgarian and Romanian chapters on the Future of 
EU Enlargement (question 2) as well as respective con-
tributions from Turkey and Croatia. 
55 Cf. the Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German and 
Luxembourgian chapters on the Future of EU Enlarge-
ment (question 2). 
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member states (citizens and governments), 
however this might change over time. Up to 
now the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) as a framework and concept to effec-
tively deal with third countries in the 
neighbourhood, excluding the membership 
question, has not gained momentum yet. Po-
land in particular is a fervent promoter of an 
active Eastern policy including a membership 
perspective.56 Some suspect this stance as be-
ing essentially containment policy vis-à-vis 
Russia and a strategy to dismantle the rest of 
the post-soviet sphere with the feeble promise 
that the EU is filling in the vacuum. With re-
gard to the EU’s policy towards Russia and 
other post-Soviet states (e.g. in the Southern 
Caucasus) a field for controversies and con-
flicting interests and perceptions among old 
and new Central and Eastern European mem-
ber states seems to be taking shape.  
 
Turkish membership is not as controversial 
any more as it already has been. Even in Ger-
many and Austria the debate cooled down. 
Assessments differ whether Turkish member-
ship will overstretch and overburden the EU, 
also concepts about the future of the EU and 
the balance between deepening and widening 
differ as has been laid down above. The ways 
to manage migration or to deal with multicul-
turalism and with Islam in particular will con-
tinue to be discussed across the EU, however 
most intensively in old member states which 
up to now have been the main target countries 
of migrants. The EU is only one framework of 
reference in these discourses and for many 
member states not the primary one.57   
 
It still seems too early to assess the impact of 
the 2004 enlargement on old and new mem-
bers. The extent of public attention and politi-
cal debate with regard to the integration of ten 
new members is limited. This also signals that 
no major frictions and disruptions neither of 
the internal market nor in other fields have 
been observed so far. The transition periods 
and terms of accession seem to work fine, irre-
spective of whether they are convincing from a 
political and economic point of view. Thus 
new member states criticise the restrictions for 
the free movement of workers. Only Sweden, 
Ireland and the UK opened their labour mar-
                                                 
56 Cf. the Polish chapter on the EU’s Role in the World 
(question 5). 
57 Cf. the Italian chapter on the Future of EU Enlarge-
ment (question 2). 
kets and are quite happy with the results.58 The 
German government insisted on a transition 
period of as long as seven years and the grand 
coalition will probably apply this maximum 
period.59 The apparent success of Eastern 
enlargement does not produce political mo-
mentum to continue this line.  
 
The importance of external factors and 
the absence of an attractive integration 
project 
 
Citizens and governments alike support more 
Europe in a sense that more collective action 
and representation of the Union is welcome 
in the least integrated fields, the CFSP/ESDP 
and issues of internal security like fighting 
terrorism and international crime.60 This does 
not necessarily correspond with claiming a 
transfer of competencies, a European army or 
border control. But these are surely the most 
dynamic areas, where European public goods 
should increasingly be provided by the EU for 
the member states. Also the new members 
discover the added value of CFSP and also 
ESDP.61 This is an interesting process for 
countries that generally favour a strong transat-
lantic link and that see NATO, i.e. the USA, as 
the primary provider of their security.  
 
The European Security Strategy is a docu-
ment where strategic interests of the 25 con-
verge. It is perceived as a good basis for a 
global and significant role of the EU. How-
ever, potentially controversial issues include: 
Russia62, Eastern Neighbours63, regionalisation 
of the CFSP64, multi-speed/directoire tenden-
                                                 
58 Cf. the Irish, Swedish and the UK chapters on the 
Future of EU Enlargement (question 2). 
59 This can be explained by sector-specific economic 
implications of EU enlargement in Germany as well as 
with cases of misuse regarding the freedom to establish a 
business, cf. the German chapter on the Future of EU 
Enlargement (question 2). 
60 Cf. e.g. the Bulgarian, Czech, French, Greek, Italian, 
Latvian, Luxembourgian and Maltese chapters on the 
EU’s Role in the World (question 5). 
61 Cf. e.g. the Cypriot, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian chapters on the EU’s Role in the World (ques-
tion 5). 
62 Cf. e.g. the Estonian and Latvian chapters on the EU’s 
Role in the World (question 5). 
63 Cf. especially the Polish chapter on the EU’s Role in 
the World (question 5). 
64 Cf. e.g. the Maltese and Portuguese chapters on the 
EU’s Role in the World (question 5). 
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cies (EU-3)65, export of democracy66 and the 
NATO-EU-relationship.67  
 
There is a lot of sympathy for institutional 
reforms as entailed in the TCE in the field of 
the CFSP/ESDP. Nevertheless, as long as the 
period of reflection continuous and the fate of 
the TCE is undecided there are only minimal 
steps towards an anticipated implementation. 
This concerns the European External Service 
as well as the Foreign Minister of the Union, 
topics that are covered intensively in the chap-
ter on the EU’s role in the world (question 5). 
  
When asked to name upcoming issues on the 
national agendas of the 29 countries that 
might over time also be uploaded to the EU 
level or influence decisions taken there many 
authors identified topics that are linked to ex-
ternal policies: minorities and neighbours 
(Hungary), immigration (Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta), Iraq troops (Italy), en-
ergy security (Austria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta), becoming full member of the Schengen 
area (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia) and 
global/international governance (Finland, 
France). 
 
While external factors increasingly seem to 
drive European integration and set priorities of 
action of the EU, an attractive integration 
project (à la Single Market or EMU) is miss-
ing. The goal to become a geostrategic actor 
cannot sufficiently mobilise political 
identification and resources and thus ensure 
political cohesion, legitimacy and effectiveness 
that is expected of the Union. As the Danish 
report puts it, the traditional vision of Europe 
as “a common project for peace is forgotten. 
Peace and security is not enough to justify the 
existence of the EU today. People are focused 
on how the EU affects their everyday lives, 
and on how they can benefit from it. The 
Foreign Minister describes this tendency 
towards a more utilitarian approach to the EU 
as ‘tomorrow’s Europe of realism in contrast to 
yesterday’s Europe of idealism’.”68 The author 
                                                 
65 Cf. e.g. the Austrian, Cypriot, German, Hungarian, 
Italian, Portuguese and Slovak chapters on the EU’s Role 
in the World (question 5). 
66 Cf. e.g. the Irish and Latvian chapters on the EU’s Role 
in the World (question 5). 
67 Cf. e.g. the Austrian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Dutch, Lat-
vian, Luxembourgian, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovenian and 
Spanish chapters on the EU’s Role in the World (question 
5). 
day’s Europe of idealism’.”68 The author of the 
Hungarian report agrees: “Sixty years after 
World War II and sixteen years after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and given the ongoing peace-
ful unification of the continent, the need for 
and the mission of the EU must be re-
formulated and shared with the public.”69 
 
Outlook: a fascinating, yet puzzling 
panorama 
 
Following the trend of the previous rounds of 
enlargement pragmatism prevails regarding the 
direction of the integration process and its 
methods. The glue is missing and a visionary 
project of integration not in sight. At the be-
ginning of 2006 the EU finds itself in a puz-
zling state of mind and with many loose end-
ings. The scenario in which the EU is trapped 
is not an unlikely one. The many elections in 
the EU member states at the national or re-
gional level (in at least 18 member states) in 
2006/2007 also limit the room for manoeuvre. 
The political crisis of the EU is to a consider-
able extent the crisis of the member states with 
many weak governments and leaders. Still, 
glimpses of hope exist that the TCE will even-
tually be ratified and take effect. 
 
The EU is looking for a new balance to cope 
with heterogeneity and diversity, to reconnect 
with the European citizens, to address the fi-
nalité issues and reconsider the meaning of 
what consolidation and limits of the EU will 
mean in the future and last but not least how to 
provide security and promote its ideas of and 
interests in global governance. 
 
Countries that have recently acceded to the 
EU seem particularly well equipped to cope 
with change and the demands of competitive-
ness. Certainly, accession is only one condi-
tion, however it seems to be a crucial one be-
cause the preparation for membership demands 
a comprehensive package of modernisation 
measures that shakes up the whole state and 
economy. New members are on a path of re-
form and still have an impetus for change that 
others lack if they do not have an equivalent 
project and coherent programme that is able to 
mobilise and direct resources over a decade or 
so. 
                                                 
68 Cf. the Danish chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 43. 
69 Cf. the Hungarian chapter on the Constitutional Crisis 
(question 1), EU-25 Watch No. 2, p. 61. 
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With regard to priorities and perspectives of 
the EU (2005-2009) there is some awareness 
that institutional reforms will be put on the 
EU’s future agenda, with or without the TCE. 
In line with a pragmatic approach this is 
likely to be done case by case and with a rather 
low level of ambition. Besides security issues 
the goals and problems dealt with under the 
Lisbon process will become a top priority for 
the EU and its member states as well as for the 
acceding countries. Both sides of Lisbon, the 
competitiveness and social cohesion demands, 
are reflected in the country contributions. A 
debate on EU wide minimum standards and 
corridors for tax rates etc. will surely be dis-
cussed across the EU.  
 
To analyse the mutually reinforcing effects of 
EU deepening and widening – this constitutes 
the main idea of EU-CONSENT, a network of 
excellence for joint research and teaching that 
stretches across Europe and which also pro-
vides the general framework for “EU-25 
Watch”.70 Throughout the analysis of the 29 
reports on key issues such as the constitutional 
crisis and period of reflection, EU enlarge-
ment, the financial framework, the Lisbon 
Agenda or the EU’s role in the world a lot of 
links, contradictions and ambiguities become 
apparent – a fascinating, yet puzzling pano-
rama of details that allows each reader to fol-
low an individual route through current Euro-
pean debates.  
                                                 
70 For more information regarding EU-CONSENT see the 
project’s internet site on www.eu-consent.net. 
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